'The Guardian' and press reform : a wheel come full circle by Cathcart, Brian




In the decade 2008–18, between the eruption of the phone hacking scandal and the cancella-
tion of part two of the Leveson Inquiry, the editorial position of The Guardian on press regu-
lation went from indifference to demanding wholesale reform, and then back to indifference
and even active opposition to change. Inevitably, this entailed reversals and contradictions,
yet these were not acknowledged to the newspaper’s readers, who are left with a misleading
impression of continuity. This study, by an academic and journalist who campaigned for reg-
ulatory reform throughout this period, aims to shed light on The Guardian’s 360-degree pro-
gression by reference to its editorials and other published statements.
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BETWEEN 2008 AND 2018 The Guardian’s public
position on press regulation underwent a
series of striking transformations. At the
beginning of the period the newspaper
showed little or no concern about the issue,
accepting without protest an industry ‘party
line’ that its complaints body, the Press
Complaints Commission (PCC), was uphold-
ing standards. This changed in 2009–10, at a
time when the paper was exposing criminal
activity at the News of the World. Breaking
ranks with the rest of the national press, The
Guardian became a leading critic of the PCC
and demanded reforms. In 2011–12, the per-
iod of the Leveson Inquiry into press con-
duct, The Guardian went further, proposing a
radically new scheme for press regulation
and in due course seeing many of its ideas
reflected in the inquiry’s recommendations.
By the time the recommendations were
incorporated into a royal charter in 2013,
however, the paper had become hesitant and
doubtful, and in the years that followed it
detached itself from the issue, set up its own
complaints arrangement and ceased to
express a view on the subject. The final turn
of the wheel came in 2017–18, when Conser-
vative ministers sought to kill off the whole
reform project: The Guardian applauded this.
It can’t be argued that The Guardian aban-
doned reform because the problem had been
satisfactorily resolved: its own boycott of the
Independent Press Standards Organisation
(IPSO), the complaints body established by the
bigger press companies as successor to the
PCC, shows that it does not believe so. Nor can
it be asserted that standards of conduct and
accuracy in the national press have improved:
high levels of public distrust provide strong
evidence to the contrary, and instances of unre-
strained press abuse surface every week.1 In
reality, the country is back where it was before
The Guardian took up the cause of reform, and
so is the newspaper. While it does not actively
promote the industry’s current ‘party line’ that
IPSO is fit for purpose, it does not challenge
that line, though many others do, and many
innocent people continue to suffer the effects of
ethical failure in the press. Passively and qui-
etly, The Guardian today accepts a regulatory
status quo that, for a time, it loudly denounced
as intolerable.
Why did The Guardian embrace the cause
of press reform? And why did it change its
mind? This article, written by a journalist
and academic who campaigned throughout
this period for effective, independent press
regulation, examines the successive policy
shifts at Britain’s leading liberal newspaper
as expressed in its editorials and public
statements, with a view to shedding light on
this 360-degree rotation.
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Taking up arms
In the year 2006, David Seymour, recently
made redundant after serving as political
editor at the Daily Mirror, told the trade jour-
nal Press Gazette: ‘The party line for all news-
papers is that the PCC is doing a fine job.’
He went on: ‘Now I can say what I really
think, and that is that the PCC is doing a
hopeless job. It is handing down verdicts
which fail to even meet the basic dictates of
common sense, let alone justice.’2 The Guar-
dian, a full member of the PCC, adhered to
the party line at that time, even as questions
about the complaints body piled up. For
example, its editorial columns said nothing
in 2007 when, in response to an avalanche of
false reporting about his daughter Made-
leine’s disappearance, Gerry McCann called
for improved press regulation. Nor did it
depart from the party line a year later when
one its own journalists, Nick Davies,
revealed in a book about the press that the
PCC upheld fewer than 1 per cent of com-
plaints made to it.3 And when in January
2009 the House of Commons Media Select
Committee, responding to growing public
concern, mounted an inquiry into the PCC,
The Guardian’s submission began: ‘We sup-
port a robust and effective system of self-reg-
ulation. Self-regulation—through the PCC or
other means—offers a quick, cheap, flexible
and effective remedy in most cases.’4
Things changed when The Guardian found
its journalism under attack and the PCC
failed to defend it. The trigger was the reve-
lation by Nick Davies in The Guardian in July
2009 that News of the World journalists had
illegally accessed mobile phone voicemails
on a large scale and that the paper’s owners,
Rupert Murdoch’s News International, had
spent nearly £1 million covering this up.
When the company responded with furious
denials and most of the rest of the national
press also took up hostile positions, The
Guardian turned to the body ostensibly
responsible for press standards. The PCC
had previously looked into hacking and had
accepted News International’s assurance that
it was the work of a single reporter acting
alone; now The Guardian had evidence to the
contrary and it asked the PCC to establish
the truth. The response was a report
declaring that the News of the World had no
case to answer and that it was The Guar-
dian’s journalism that was at fault.
The Guardian’s editor, Alan Rusbridger,
promptly resigned his seat on the PCC code
committee while an editorial declared:
To call it [the PCC] a “regulator” increas-
ingly looks misleading. Credible regulators
have teeth. They have powers to investigate,
to call for evidence and to impose sanctions
. . . This newspaper has supported effective
self-regulation, believing that any other form
of control or limits on the press would be
worse. We still believe that. But the form
self-regulation currently takes is not very
credible.5
Although this was an unambiguous depar-
ture from the industry’s ‘party line’, The
Guardian’s demands were relatively modest.
It wanted the PCC to have the power to get
past the lies of big companies and find the
truth, and it wanted errant newspapers pun-
ished. There was no challenge yet to the
principle that only the press could manage
its own regulation; indeed The Guardian
accepted a binary interpretation of the mat-
ter: either the press regulated itself or the
state would, and there could be nothing in
between. Notably too, The Guardian’s argu-
ments scarcely addressed the problem raised
earlier by McCann, Davies and others: that
the PCC was failing the victims of unethical
journalism. The paper had shifted, but only
by a quarter turn, or 90 degrees.
Root and branch
More than any other body or group, The
Guardian brought about the Leveson Inquiry
of 2011–12. Its reporting provoked an earth-
quake in the establishment, causing the clo-
sure of the News of the World, the
abandonment of Murdoch’s £8 billion bid for
outright ownership of Sky TV and a cascade
of high-level resignations, while at the same
time forcing the political world into a rare
moment of contrition and consensus. The
three main parties of the time, the Conserva-
tives and Liberal Democrats (then in coali-
tion), and the opposition Labour Party,
agreed on the establishment of the inquiry
under Sir Brian Leveson with a remit to find
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out what had gone wrong in the worlds of
the press, the police and politics, and to
identify lessons to be learned. The Guardian
was adamant that there had to be conse-
quences: ‘This must not be a repeat of Iraq,
in which three extra inquiries gradually
uncovered the truth, but in a way which has
left those responsible unscathed and the law
unaffected.’6 However, since the criminal
matters within the inquiry’s remit were by
now sub judice it was necessary to proceed
by stages. Criminality and who was respon-
sible for it had to be deferred until the law
had run its course, and this deferred phase
became known as Leveson 2. Delay or no,
The Guardian said the whole truth must be
laid bare: ‘Many of the most egregious
aspects of the phone-hacking saga, not least
the scale of the abuse, will remain unclear
until the police investigation is completed
and until any criminal proceedings have
been completed too . . . Yet without full
knowledge there is a danger that the solu-
tions and new structures which the inquiry
is now starting to examine will not address
the hardest examples of abuse.’7
The first phase of the inquiry was largely
devoted to regulatory reform and here,
amidst lively public debate, The Guardian ’s
position moved through another quarter
turn. The paper’s thoughts on the matter
were set out in detail in a closing submission
to the inquiry in July 2012, and were sum-
marised in an editorial that November:
We believe in independent regulation, both
from politicians and the press itself. We do
believe in a contract system – not the use of
statute – to secure participation. But we also
believe in an arbitral arm which incentivises
the regulated to pursue high standards and
penalises anyone who walks away. We
believe that the regulator must have real
investigatory powers and sanctions.8
This requires elaboration. The paper con-
tinued to call for the press regulator to have
investigatory powers and sanctions and it
had long insisted that regulation must be
free of political influence. Equally, it opposed
the use of statute to make participation in
regulation mandatory because this smacked
of licensing: governments should not have
the power to decide who may publish and
who may not. Instead, it favoured a contract
system to bind publishers in, something also
favoured by the big companies. Thus far the
paper stood on familiar ground; the rest of
the menu, however, reflected new thinking.
The assertion that regulation should be inde-
pendent ‘from the press itself’ demonstrated
a break with the binary assumption that no
alternatives lay between self-regulation and
state regulation. This was an acknowledge-
ment that altering the rules of a regulator
would make little difference if the power to
pull the strings remained with the big com-
panies. A regulator, it was clear, must be
independent to be effective.
Also new was the ‘arbitral arm’. For years
it had been a complaint of some newspapers,
and particularly The Guardian, that the cost
of defending journalism in court was so high
that their ability to report the facts was in
jeopardy.9 Rich litigants had the power to
deter or ‘chill’ journalistic inquiry merely by
threatening civil actions that would impose
large financial risks on publishers. The Guar-
dian saw in the Leveson Inquiry ‘a historic
chance’ to remedy this, proposing in its edi-
torial on 23 December 2011 that a new regu-
lator should offer a low-cost arbitration
service to deal with cases of libel and breach
of privacy. And this idea had brought
another in its train. Access to this service
might serve as an incentive to participation
in the new, more effective regulator—if you
are in you get the benefits, and if you are
not you don’t.
A further, linked development in The
Guardian’s thinking was its new position on
statute. For years, the party line across the
industry was that any Act of Parliament
relating to press regulation was unthinkable:
it would by definition create state regulation.
The Guardian no longer believed this. Legisla-
tion, it said, must be carefully scrutinised to
ensure it did not unjustifiably constrain free-
dom of expression, but it was not anathema.
It might reasonably be used, for example, to
‘recognise’ or give authority to an indepen-
dent regulator, and to give legal effect to
[Correction added on 20 January 2021, after first
online publication: Quotes on pages 3, 4 and 7 were
misplaced and have now been corrected in this ver-
sion.]
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incentives to participation—what the paper
called the ‘carrots and sticks’ associated with
its desired arbitral arm. An editorial in
November 2012 argued:
Some observers point out that such an arbi-
tral system would need to be enshrined in
law with the press regulator recognised in
statute. That may be true, but this use of sta-
tute merely builds on the precedent of sec-
tion 12 of the Human Rights Act, which asks
judges to consider regulatory codes in their
deliberations over free expression. For the
press to oppose such a limited use of statute
as a matter of principle would seem to be
counter-productive.10
Where the carrots and sticks were con-
cerned, The Guardian’s closing submission to
the inquiry urged that judges should be
encouraged to back the new system in the
way they awarded costs: ‘An unreasonable
decision to pursue legal proceedings would
be likely to leave the claimant exposed to
paying the costs of those proceedings, irre-
spective of their outcome.’11 In other words,
The Guardian proposed that any litigants
who forced news publishers to go to court
despite the availability of cheaper arbitration
should face having to pay all the legal costs
of both sides, even where those litigants
won their cases. Newspapers could thus be
confident they could defend their journalism
without incurring daunting financial risk. In
addition, since this protection would only be
available to news publishers participating in
the regulator operating the arbitration ser-
vice, this would help make it ‘highly unli-
kely and economically illogical’ for
newspapers to reject membership.12 And if
statute was needed to make this effective,
the paper said, ‘provided potential unin-
tended consequences are properly thought
through, we would support this’.13
This ambitious and closely argued posi-
tion, in favour of independent, effective reg-
ulation incorporating an arbitral arm and
with carrots and sticks to encourage mem-
bership, placed The Guardian wholly at odds
with the larger national newspaper corpora-
tions. Though the Murdoch, Mail, Mirror,
Telegraph and Express groups had been
forced to admit the failure of the PCC, at the
inquiry they offered only minimal changes
which, notably, would leave them still in
control. They had little interest in an arbitral
arm (as wealthy companies they felt the
effect of court costs less keenly), less interest
in The Guardian’s carrots and none at all in
its sticks. Reviewing the regulatory scheme
advanced by these companies, The Guardian
made what positive noises it could, but it
balked in particular at the failure to make
regulation independent. This, after all, had
been the starting point for the paper: it was
because the PCC was a puppet of these com-
panies that it failed to support The Guardian
over phone hacking.
Thus, it can be said that in November
2012, when the first phase of the Leveson
process ended, the paper occupied some-
thing like the opposite position from the one
it had held before Davies’s hacking stories.
From passively accepting a party line that
press regulation was satisfactory in the teeth
of considerable evidence that it was not, it
had become a leading advocate, if not the
leading advocate, of root and branch reforms
that most of the rest of the industry rejected.
The half turn—180 degrees—was complete.
Second thoughts
After Sir Brian Leveson published his report,
a Guardian editorial summarised its recom-
mendations as follows:
. . . he put forward something he described
as independent regulation, organised by the
press itself, with a statutory underpinning
and verification. It would be voluntary—but
participation would be incentivised by the
carrot and stick of belonging to an arbitral
system that would give significant cost and
damages advantages in libel or privacy
actions. In order to cement these legal bene-
fits, Leveson advocated some statutory
underpinning.14
On the face of it this should have been
very welcome to The Guardian: if its earlier
summary of its position on regulation,
quoted above, had been a checklist, then this
ticked every box, while the proposals of the
bigger newspaper companies were rejected
as inadequate. However, as Guardian editori-
als pointed out, the devil in these matters is
in the detail. An inquiry makes
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recommendations; it is up to politicians to
implement, or not. And while Leveson’s rec-
ommendations were clear, they were not
always expressed in the language of legisla-
tion or of rules. It took more than four
months of sometimes confrontational negoti-
ations between the three main parties before
the details were hammered out and agree-
ment was reached. The bulk of the regula-
tory recommendations were delivered in the
form of a royal charter, while short passages
were inserted into two bills then before Par-
liament, one shielding the charter from polit-
ical meddling and the other enabling carrot
and stick incentives to participation using
court costs.
This arrangement, which met with over-
whelming approval in Parliament but was
rejected by the big newspaper companies,
ultimately failed to satisfy The Guardian,
though the paper’s editorials of the time did
not explain why. There were several such
editorials, both before and after the political
agreement, and also a long article by Rus-
bridger. They are worth revisiting.
First, though on 22 February 2013 The
Guardian criticised the process of political
negotiation as insufficiently transparent and
‘a bit of a mess’, it ended up satisfied, nota-
bly because in its later weeks the debate
became more open. Thus, an editorial the
following month stated with approval: ‘All
sides in the debate have moved during the
course of the past few months, including the
political parties, the press and the campaign-
ers on behalf of the victims of press abuse.’15
Second, and in similar vein, The Guardian,
though it disliked the use of royal charter,
ultimately endorsed it. By nature undemo-
cratic, this ancient instrument was declared
acceptable as a means of delivering the regu-
latory regime because it was accompanied
by that clause in legislation protecting it
from alteration by politicians. This was, the
paper said, ‘the least-worst option’ in the cir-
cumstances and ‘a reasonable solution to a
difficult problem’.16
The Guardian only complained with any
urgency about one element of the reform
package: the inclusion among the carrots
and sticks of exemplary damages, meaning
those damages awarded against a losing
party in a civil case, not as compensation for
the victim of a wrong, but as punishment for
the perpetrator. Under the new scheme news
publishers participating in charter-standard
regulation would face no risk of exemplary
damages in the courts, while those that
stayed out would not have that immunity.
The Guardian declared itself ‘strongly
opposed’ to this arrangement. Rusbridger
warned that ‘a magazine such as Private Eye
or websites for which regulation was never
intended could face crippling damages
which could put them out of business’.17
This was an unlikely point about which to
complain. The power to award exemplary
damages had long been available to judges
in libel cases, and strikingly none had been
awarded in decades. What was new in 2013
was that they would also be available in pri-
vacy cases (never a significant concern at Pri-
vate Eye) and that members of charter-
standard regulators would be exempt. Also
new was that the bar for such awards was
set extremely high: they could only be con-
sidered where a defendant had shown ‘a
deliberate or reckless disregard of an outra-
geous nature for the claimant’s rights’.18 The
risk to news publishers was therefore not
new, very remote and avoidable. It is easy to
see why The Guardian’s concern on the point
quickly faded away.
Guardian editorials in the weeks after the
political agreement on regulation show that
the paper was unhappy and uncomfortable,
but the cause of this feeling was not the
nitty-gritty of the charter and the clauses of
legislation. If the devil was in the detail, The
Guardian identified no detail to its readers as
sufficiently unacceptable to be a sticking
point. Instead, it was concerned about the
stubborn resistance of the big newspaper
companies and it put forward a series of
proposals in the hope of fending off an open
breach with them. It wanted delay; it wanted
to reopen talks with all interested parties
around the table; it proposed a loose, infor-
mal regulatory arrangement which could be
tested for a year to see if it worked. The big
companies were not interested. But though
they remained relentlessly hostile to the
charter and to regulatory independence of
the kind that was the most basic Guardian
requirement, the paper would not draw a
line.
It could have confronted the industry’s
leaders, unpicked their arguments,
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denounced their intransigence and declared
that The Guardian would take the lead in
launching a reformed regulatory system.
That system, after all, was remarkably close
to what the paper had asked for at the Leve-
son Inquiry, and it had behind it the author-
ity not only of a senior judge at a long
public inquiry but also of a rare cross-party
agreement in Parliament and, as successive
opinion polls showed, of the public. Indeed,
support for change appeared particularly
high among Guardian readers. A YouGov
poll in May 2013 showed 67 per cent wanted
their paper to join a charter-standard regula-
tor and another poll two years later found
that 77 per cent either backed the Leveson
reforms or felt they did not go far enough.19
The Guardian also had authority of its own in
this matter, having precipitated the crisis by
exposing phone hacking and having set the
pace in defining a remedy. Had it declared
its backing for Leveson-standard regulation,
others such as the Financial Times and the
Independent might have followed, which
would have put the charter scheme to a pub-
lic test in the national newspaper world and,
had it proved satisfactory, greatly increased
pressure on the big companies to accept
change.
The Guardian did not draw the line in 2013
and has not drawn it since. It chose a different
course. When the big companies set up IPSO
the following year The Guardian declined to
join, pointing to IPSO’s lack of independence.
Having thus secured itself against any recur-
rence of its 2009 experience with the PCC, the
paper set up its own complaints system,
which falls far short of the standards of inde-
pendence it had previously declared neces-
sary. This became The Guardian’s regulatory
status quo. At the same time, the paper
accepted the new status quo elsewhere, offer-
ing no further public criticism of IPSO. It paid
no notice in its editorial columns to the
mounting evidence that IPSO was no better
than the PCC, and with Nick Davies retired, it
all but ceased to scrutinise the conduct of
other papers. It came to accept, if not actively
to endorse, the new ‘party line’ in the indus-
try, which was that IPSO was fit for purpose.
This was another quarter turn: the wheel had
now gone through 270 degrees. The circle
would be completed in 2017–18.
A new party line
The Conservative governments in power
after 2015 refused to allow the incentives
associated with the charter to enter into
force, thus hobbling the entire reform pro-
ject, and in early 2017 Theresa May’s govern-
ment announced its intention to go a step
further and bin reform entirely. It wanted to
cancel Leveson 2 and repeal Section 40 of
the Crime and Courts Act 2013, the clause
that had been meant to deliver the court
costs incentives. This course of action had
been urged by the Murdoch, Mirror and Mail
papers, the very organisations that were
likely to be the main subjects of scrutiny by
the second inquiry, and it was also proposed
without seeking cross-party agreement of the
kind thought necessary a few years earlier.
Opposed to it were most other political par-
ties, Sir Brian Leveson and, polls again
showed, most of the public.20 Labour and
the Liberal Democrats took the occasion to
advocate equally decisive moves in the
opposite direction: they wanted Parliament
to launch Leveson 2 and at the same time
give effect to the incentives, so reviving the
stalled business of regulatory reform. Given
that the Conservatives did not have a Com-
mons majority and a number of their back-
benchers favoured reform, the vote promised
to be close.
The Guardian supported the May govern-
ment. It opened its attack on Section 40 in
an editorial which complained: ‘Those that
refuse to join a system of regulation would
be subjected to a form of unnatural justice:
non-cooperative newspapers face paying the
legal costs of both sides even in cases they
win.’21 This betrayed a level of amnesia: The
Guardian itself, after all, had proposed in
2012 that litigants who bypassed arbitration
should risk paying the costs of proceedings
‘irrespective of their outcome’. It did not
then consider this unnatural justice. The edi-
torial went on to assert that Section 40
would ‘have a deeply chilling effect on
investigative journalism’ because editors
would fear to confront anyone with deep
pockets. Again, this overlooked The Guar-
dian’s previous view, which was that carrots
and sticks would have the opposite effect.
Whether complainants took the arbitration
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or the court route, the financial risk for news
publishers would be far smaller so long as
they had joined an appropriate regulator,
and so the danger of chilling would all but
disappear. Indeed, The Guardian had thought
that, far from penalising news publishers,
such arrangements would make it ‘highly
unlikely and economically illogical’ that they
would refuse to join.
The Guardian also made a submission to a
government consultation on the matter in
which it identified as a sticking point one
detail of Section 40 which had never previ-
ously surfaced as a concern in its editorial
columns:
Clause 2(b) of S.40 states that courts can still
award costs against a relevant publisher who
is a member of a recognised regulator if “it
is just and equitable in all the circumstances
of the case to award costs against the defen-
dant.” Therefore even in the context of
weighing up protection from S.40 against the
costs of regulation, there is no guarantee that
a publisher is protected.22
This brief sub-paragraph, The Guardian
argued, wiped away any potential benefits
of the legislation because, by giving judges a
degree of discretion, it denied news publish-
ers the certainty that their costs would be
paid. This being the case, the paper said, edi-
tors would still be exposed to chilling by rich
litigants and Section 40 would offer no
incentive to participate in charter-standard
regulation. The thinking here is perverse.
The wording of the legislation left no doubt
that this sub-paragraph was designed to
accommodate exceptions; it was a safety
valve to avoid the risk of injustice in cases of
a kind legislators could not foresee, but that
judges would be expected to recognise. The
Guardian, however, chose to read the excep-
tion as the rule, asserting that news publish-
ers must assume that judges would routinely
do something the law clearly expected them
to do only rarely. To put it another way, The
Guardian was demanding a guaranteed out-
come even where a judge familiar with all
the facts could see that such an outcome was
not ‘just and equitable in all the circum-
stances’. And the paper was not even consis-
tent in its distrust of judges. The submission
also suggested that the best way of ensuring
that the public had access to justice was ‘to
leave it to the courts to exercise their existing
discretionary powers to encourage parties to
use arbitration’. So the newspaper thought
judges should be trusted where they enjoyed
unfettered discretion, but not where, as
under Section 40, their discretion was con-
strained by statutory presumption.
As the vote drew nearer, the paper
returned to the subject in its editorial col-
umn: ‘Is it feasible to improve the culture,
practice and ethics of the press and at the
same time protect and promote the best of
journalism in the public interest? The gov-
ernment thinks so—without recourse to the
second part of the Leveson inquiry. This
approach should be given a chance.’23 The
Guardian’s endorsement of the government’s
plan was clear, even if its reasoning was not.
Improving press culture and protecting good
journalism, after all, had been the task of the
first part of the inquiry; Leveson 2 was
meant to tackle criminality and find who
was responsible. The argument that followed
was no more cogent, but its thrust was that
Leveson 2 was unnecessary. Thus a paper
that had once argued that ‘refuge from scru-
tiny is not an option’, that it was ‘hugely in
the national interest to find out what was
going on’ and that the inquiry process
launched in 2011 must not leave ‘those
responsible unscathed and the law unaf-
fected’ now declared: ‘Leveson 2 would ulti-
mately end up like a driver learning to steer
by looking in the rear-view mirror at the
road behind rather than the one ahead.’24
And the paper that had once insisted that
press regulation must be effective and inde-
pendent now warned, bizarrely, that ‘Leve-
son 2 would raise the threat of press
regulation’, as if press regulation were intrin-
sically bad.
There was more. In 2012 and 2013 The
Guardian had firmly rejected the conflation of
statute with censorship and insisted that leg-
islation to protect the charter was justified.
‘For the press to oppose such a limited use
of statute as a matter of principle’, it had
declared, ‘would seem to be counter-produc-
tive’.25 Now, however, echoing the propa-
ganda of the big companies, The Guardian
casually equated charter regulation with
state regulation. ‘It is wrong’, it claimed, ‘to
think a state body should hold the exercise of
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power by the press to account’. Opposition
manoeuvres in Parliament designed to bring
the carrots and sticks into effect, it warned,
‘could end up as a Trojan horse for state-
backed press regulation’ (author’s italics).26
On 9 May 2018 the May government
secured the cancellation of Leveson 2 by nine
Commons votes, the assistance of the Demo-
cratic Unionist Party proving decisive. The
stick and carrot legislation was not repealed,
but neither was it put into effect, meaning
that news publishers remain under no pres-
sure to participate in reformed regulation.
The Guardian had played its part: during the
Commons debate its stance was cited with
approval more than once by the Culture Sec-
retary, Matt Hancock, and also by other Con-
servative MPs.27 The paper thus helped
cancel a public inquiry that had originally
been established at its own instigation and
by cross-party agreement, and which the
chair himself said was needed. It also repudi-
ated as a threat to journalism incentives of
the kind it had asked for in 2012 and to
which in 2013 it had made no serious objec-
tion, while in its arguments it embraced the
binary view of regulation it had previously
rejected. So far as press regulation was con-
cerned, in other words, The Guardian was
now the enemy of what it had once stood for
and the ally of papers whose intransigence it
once decried and whose hysterical propa-
ganda it once mocked—a volte-face it never
acknowledged or explained to its readers.28
This is not an abstruse matter, nor is it a
concern restricted to the passing age of
printed newspapers. The failure to uphold
standards by making journalists accountable
for inaccuracy, discrimination, and other
abuses, continues to claim many victims. It
also frees national newspapers to poison
important public debates with distortions
and falsehoods, and to encourage hatred.
The Guardian may occasionally report on,
and its comment pages may occasionally
refer to, instances of regulatory failure, but
its editorial columns remain silent. Thus, it
reported—albeit briefly—the revelation in
Parliament that IPSO, having received 8,148
complaints about discrimination in one year,
managed to uphold only one. It reported
that, in flagrant disregard of the principle of
regulatory independence, a senior Conserva-
tive politician, Lord Faulks, was made
IPSO’s chair. It mentioned, too, that IPSO
conducts no investigations and imposes no
fines. But The Guardian offers no editorial
view on these matters. It draws no conclu-
sions and offers no leadership. Indeed, it has
said that IPSO ‘should be allowed to con-
tinue’.29 In the twenty-first century’s version
of Fleet Street there is once again a party line
on press regulation, and as surely as if it
were The Telegraph or The Sun, The Guardian
adheres to it.
Brian Cathcart is Professor of Journalism at
Kingston University, London, and was a
founder and the first director (2012–14) of
Hacked Off.
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